

# RESERVES 2000

Prudent Defence

# COMMUNIQUE

80 Church St, Toronto, ON M5C 2G1. Tel (416) 868-1186 Fax (416) 364-5395 April 2011  
E-mail [r2000@commissionaires.ca](mailto:r2000@commissionaires.ca)

## ENDGAME FOR MILITIA PAY REFORM

As predicted in earlier editions of Communiqué, defence planners have played out the clock on Militia pay reform. There has been no new policy developed, as Minister MacKay directed last year. And at the recent Conference of Defence Associations annual gathering, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) offered no clue as to when he would have one. Now the election will bring a new Minister of National Defence. The only reason defence planners were engaged at all in developing a policy to prevent future pillage of the Militia budget was the wrath of Mr MacKay, who was incensed by their blunders on the file in late 2009. The age-old game of "Yes, Minister" proves once again to be an effective bureaucratic tool.

The Conference of Defence Associations has continued to seek a response from the VCDS. Their latest letter to him is enclosed.

During this election campaign supporters should raise the issue of unequal treatment of reservists and the lack of progress in redressing the problem at every opportunity.

## 2011 ELECTION

As we all know, Canadians are going to the polls on the 2nd of May. How can supporters of the Militia take advantage of this opportunity to inject our concerns into national and local debates?

First, candidates have to know what we stand for. This has to be stated in the simplest terms possible. Think sound bites. Suggestion: "Canada must spend defence dollars more prudently. Do

more with reservists". Canada cannot afford the current defence budget (\$22 billion) but must have capable armed forces. The solution is to do more with reserve forces because they are more cost effective than regulars.

Zero in on your riding and extol the virtues of maintaining a strong Militia presence there. Some of these benefits are: federal funding coming to the riding, youth employment, life-skills training, work-skills training such as teamwork, leadership training, opportunities for all Canadians to participate in nation building and the guarantee of local back-up to first responders in the case of major emergency. These are opportunities that flow from maintaining a healthy Militia presence in the riding. Yet, the regular establishment accounts for over 90% of the defence budget while present in only a few ridings.

Next, make sure the candidate understands your unit will be at risk when defence planners have to cope with the budget cuts they will endure after the election. The cuts announced in the budget that was introduced just before the Government fell were likely only the tip of the iceberg. We've seen it all before and we've also seen defence planners try to balance the books on the backs of Militia units.

Ask the candidate to press his party for a clear statement that the Militia will be a priority for the next government. The enclosed paper titled An Election Platform for the Militia suggests a platform that, if adopted by the winning party, would provide a good bulwark against the sharp knives sure to come out as soon as the new government is formed. We cannot cede the initiative.

## EDITORIAL

When the election is over the Militia will face a very serious threat. If the Conservatives are elected, especially with a majority, they will likely tackle the current account deficit with a vengeance. If the Liberals win, and especially if they enter into any deal with the New Democrats, defence spending will be a low priority. Either way resources for defence are likely to be scarce. And when dollars are short defence planners turn first to the reserves to fund the shortfall. Despite the proven value of Militia soldiers on the Afghanistan mission and the crying need to field significant forces for domestic operations, the Militia will once again be threatened with unit closures and amalgamations.

For proof of trouble on the horizon one does not need to look further than the budget introduced just before the Government was defeated. In a Canadian Press story dated 23 March, it is stated, referring to the budget, that "Flaherty said he expected Defence to account for up to 26 per cent of the federal government's expected \$2 billion in spending cuts next year. The level jumps to 35 per cent in both 2013 and 2014 — or \$1 billion a year. Budget documents call the restraint measures at Defence "a key element" of the plan to wipe the anticipated \$29.6 billion deficit for 2011-12 off the books."

The most recent unfolding of events regarding the creation of an equal and fair Militia pay policy is evidence enough that defence planners are not prepared to relinquish their control over a portion of the defence budget (Militia pay) that has historically been theirs to dispose of as they saw fit - no matter the cost to reservists. They will be even less inclined to direct further scarce resources to the Militia in the months ahead.

When a similar deficit reduction scenario unfolded in the mid-1990s, Reserves 2000 conducted a focused and disciplined campaign that resulted in minimum cuts to units. Just as importantly, that campaign led to our continuing efforts to maintain a profile with Parliamentarians and this has paid off on several occasions since, most recently last year when the Minister restored Militia pay after it was pillaged in late 2009.

Militia supporters must, therefore, take the case for a strong Militia to the only decision makers who have supported our position in the past – Parliamentarians. Please use the opportunity provided by the election to spread our message, as outlined in the attached An Election Platform for the Militia, to all candidates and to all Canadians. We have won before and we will win again.

*Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more...*

---

**Reserves 2000** is a coalition of Canadians concerned with the security and defence of our country, now and in the future. Among its constituents, **Reserves 2000** includes Honorary Appointments from Reserve and Militia units across Canada, along with responsible citizens from all walks of life.

The purpose of **Reserves 2000** is to ensure the perpetuation and contribution of Canada's Reserves and Militia as a viable and important component of Canada's Forces in the context of present and future challenges.



**CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS**  
**LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE**

222 SOMERSET STREET WEST, SUITE 400B, OTTAWA ON K2P 2G3  
TEL: (613) 236-9903 FAX: (613) 236-8191 E-mail: [director@cda-cda.ca](mailto:director@cda-cda.ca)  
<http://www.cda-cda.ca>

15 March 2011

Vice-Admiral A.B. Donaldson, CMM, CD  
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff  
MGen George R. Pearkes Bldg  
101 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa On K1A0K2

Re: Commitment to stable Funding for part-time Reservists.

Dear *Admiral*


Once again, thank you for briefing us at our annual Conference, and also for attending the closing dinner of the Conference of Defence Associations' AGM, on 25 February last. It was a particular pleasure to speak with you on the occasion of the closing dinner. I also wish to thank you for your most candid presentation to the CDA Council, on the 23<sup>rd</sup>, on the various personnel and fiscal challenges that we will be facing in the next few years.

Members of the CDA were grateful for the briefing, but felt that the response missed the crucial point of addressing the mechanisms by which part-time reservists were, at very short, or without, notice, denied training and pay. This injustice remains and violates the basic, understood, and mutual commitment between part-time volunteer reservists and the CF, in the service of Canada. Predictable pay and training are matters of commitment on the part of Canada to part-time reservist citizens who fulfill a mutually agreed and important duty. To violate this commitment seriously strains the strategic reliance Canada places on this form of volunteerism, at home and abroad, in times of need. The problem is one of fundamental inequity in terms of service, a problem which we believe must be addressed whether the announced *Primary Reserve Employment Capacity Study* shows Canada needs 10 reservists or 10,000. Inconsistent, unpredictable and poorly managed funding is the issue; an issue that has a great impact on training, operational capacity (that CFDP calls for of the Reserves), equipment, armouries and on attracting and retaining quality volunteers.

We hope that our concern over commitment and protection of part-time reservist funding will be comprehensively addressed in the *Primary Reserve Employment Capacity Study*, a study whose completion date, we understand, is sometime in May 2011.

By that time, we trust that processes and funds will be in place to ensure Canada honours its commitment to part time reserve service.

Respectfully yours,



Richard Evraire  
Lieutenant-général (ret.)  
Chairman

cc. Chief of Defence Staff, General Water J. Natynczyk, CMM, MSC, CD

## AN ELECTION PLATFORM FOR THE MILITIA

**“Defending Canadians from threats to their safety and well-being is a critical role for government. To deliver on this core responsibility, the Government is committed to rebuilding the Canadian Forces into a first-class, modern military.”**

From the introduction to the Canada First Defence Strategy, released by the Government of Canada, 12 May 2008

**“In the final analysis, a Great Power will take whatever action it finds necessary to the maintenance of its security. It must do this or cease to be a Great Power, and the United States is no exception...in the final analysis the security of the United States is the security of Canada.”**

R. J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” *International Journal*, Vol. XVIII, No.3, summer 1962, p. 203

### PREAMBLE

The army reserve, more properly known as the Militia, is a wasting resource. Long undervalued, it began a serious decline in the 1990s and despite efforts by recent governments to restore it, current departmental policies have further weakened it. Canada must reverse that trend and allow all Canadians to reap the benefits of a robust citizen’s army.

### THE NEED

Canada is a huge nation with long and virtually uninhabited coasts, a vast and empty arctic, an equally vast and nearly empty boreal forest, and an enormous contiguous mountain area. The Canadian economy is dependent upon uninterrupted lines of road, rail and energy transmission lines running from coast to coast, north into the boreal forest, and south to the United States. A few clusters of large urban populations contain practically all government and manufacturing, financial markets and communication nodes. As a very large nation geographically we are more vulnerable than most to damage to our energy, communications and transportation infrastructure.

Our population centres depend on them for the most basic human needs, including heat and food. We must also be mindful of the dependence of the United States on our energy exports.

Canada can only afford to maintain a standing security force capable of reacting to but a fraction of the potential disruptions that an organized threat to infrastructure could muster. While limited police, auxiliary police and private security resources do exist, only the army can offer large, trained, and self-sufficient forces. The regular army is available on short notice, but in limited numbers - and could have concurrent demanding overseas commitments. To sustain preventive security or consequence management operations, especially in remote areas, the Militia is the only force Canada can call upon and today it is woefully small for the task.

Because the United States is dependent upon our energy exports, if unlawful action within Canada cuts the supply of that energy, and Canada cannot quickly resolve the problem, they may unilaterally decide to deploy their own forces here. The consequent diminishment of Canadian sovereignty would be politically catastrophic for any government.

## THE PROBLEM

The Militia is currently not sufficiently robust to undertake infrastructure protection and win the day. Without re-invigoration its crucial potential to preserve Canada cannot be realized.

Since the Conservative Party of Canada first formed a government in 2006 the defence budget has almost doubled, but the increase has gone to fight the war in Afghanistan and to re-equip a Canadian Forces run down by previous neglect. Thus, despite the large increase in defence funding, the deployable strength of the Forces has barely budged.

The requirements of the war in Afghanistan have almost totally subverted the efforts of the Canadian Army for the last several years. For the Militia this has been both positive and negative. On the positive side the worth of individual army reservists has been proven in combat and much hard-won experience and trust has been gained by the Militia as an institution. On the negative side the institution is now seen primarily as a reserve-in-being, with a focus on providing individuals to augment regular army units or to provide composite units and sub-units for limited domestic operations. What Canada needs, to meet the demanding requirements of large-scale domestic operations to protect infrastructure and communities, is a strategic reserve, one that can be mobilized to guarantee a home grown force capable of winning the struggle. For, if such a force is not available at the critical moment, our great American friends will do the job themselves – *because they depend on an uninterrupted supply of our resources.*

Former Minister of National Defence Gordon O'Conner sensed this huge dilemma when he proposed the creation of "territorial defence battalions", units he envisaged would be in addition to the existing Militia structure. The defence bureaucracy thought differently and in a drawn-out

battle of attrition wore his concept down to the current plan to provide domestic capability solely from within the current Militia establishment through the expediency of creating composite units for the purpose. The result is ten composite units and four composite northern response companies which could total about 10,000 soldiers. Given the extent of Canada's vulnerability and the need to sustain operations for perhaps months, or even years, this arrangement is hardly reassuring. In order to meet the realistic needs of domestic operations the size of the Militia must increase to at least 45,000 part-time soldiers. This figure is based upon a detailed estimate of the resources required to operate effectively and for a long period of time in all areas of Canada - *because a serious adversary will ensure there are multiple threats.*

If Canada is to rely on Militia soldiers for domestic protection, as it has counted on them in Afghanistan, those soldiers deserve the respect of Canadians expressed in a tangible manner. This is currently not the case because the pay of reservists is not treated within the Department of National Defence the same as pay of the regular force or civilian employees of the Department. Militia pay is categorized as operations and maintenance and is thus available toward the end of every fiscal year to offset shortages elsewhere in the defence budget. This raiding of Militia pay has happened many times in the past, but in December of 2009 it was particularly dramatic and many Militia soldiers were informed they would be without their part-time employment until March of 2010. Minister MacKay very quickly ordered the cuts reversed but not before morale took a serious tumble and attrition rose. He ordered the Department to develop policies to prevent similar turmoil in future, but as late as Feb 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2011 the VCDS advised the Conference of Defence Associations he was still working on the problem. Now an election has been called the current Minister will likely not return and there is nothing to ensure defence planners comply with his direction to find a solution to prevent recurrence.

In order to sustain the war in Afghanistan the Army has found up to 20% of all personnel for some deployments from the reserves. It also hired thousands of reservists on full-time duty to fill empty positions the Afghanistan surge left in Canada. It is thought that when these individuals return to their Militia units the institution will benefit greatly from their experiences but in the meantime institutional recruit quotas are set on *total* Militia strength which means Militia units, comprised almost exclusively of part-timers, are shrinking because the thousands on full-time duty are no longer in those units and are no longer counted in the base upon which funding decisions are made. And when units shrink the defence bureaucracy calls for blood; in the view of NDHQ small units should be closed or amalgamated.

Afghanistan has also dominated the army training agenda. The emphasis on individual augmentation by Militia soldiers to regular units has put such a premium on high levels of individual skills that all Militia soldiers are being asked to approach regular army standards on courses, especially leadership courses. Most part-time soldiers, in particular those who have finished school and do not have long blocks of time in the summer available for training, find current course lengths and timings make it very difficult to advance in rank. A lack of leaders, both officers and non-commissioned, will eventually destroy units just as surely as closure orders

from Ottawa. The Army must recognize there are fundamental differences between full and part-time employees and provide training opportunities for part-time staff, not simply full-time staff.

## THE SOLUTION

While the Militia must increase in size to at least 45,000 part-time soldiers adding more to the defence budget is not an option most Canadians support. Increasing the size of the Militia, however, is not an expensive proposition and could be funded with no increase to the defence budget. It could be achieved through a multi-year programme of reductions to current administrative overheads in the Department of National Defence.

Today there are only 15,000 part-time Militia soldiers, the remainder, up to the total strength of 21,000, being on full-time duty. An increase to 45,000 will demand more funding for part-time wages and personal equipment but little else as the infrastructure for a much larger Militia, such as buildings and training facilities, has existed for decades. The increase must be phased and a very modest rate of growth would be 3,000 per year for ten years. At an average of \$20,000 per year per soldier (one fifth the average cost of a full-time soldier), the incremental cost would only be \$60 million per year or .003% of a \$20 billion per year defence budget. Looked at another way, the average cost of one civilian employee of the Department of National Defence (including salary, benefits and pension provisions) is about \$100,000. Sixty million per year would be the cost of only 600 full-time civilian defence employees – and the Department of National Defence is currently 3,500 civilian employees over the Treasury Board approved establishment. The massive headquarters structure now carried by the department, recommended by Lieutenant-General Leslie for downsizing, employs many civilians.

Addressing the problem of pay inequity between part-time soldiers and their full-time soldier and civilian counterparts within the Department of National Defence will not cost a penny more. This is an issue of fundamental equality and by making Militia pay untouchable during the course of a fiscal year a new government would gain untold goodwill. This will be a vote getter in many ridings.

Recruiting and training must be based upon the reality of part-time soldiering. Statements that a new government would address these long festering problems would also garner much support.

In the end, however, fixing the Militia is about more than votes. It is the right thing to do for Canada and all Canadians.



## RECCOMENDED ENDORSEMENT BY CANDIDATES

Any party that recognizes the need for a larger Militia, acknowledges the problems it faces today and agrees to re-vitalize the institution by promoting change as outlined above it will garner the support of many more Canadians. Statements along the following lines would be most welcome from candidates and parties:

- The magnificent contribution made by Militia soldiers in Afghanistan is recognized. A new government will build on that contribution to ensure Canadians are protected from domestic vulnerabilities by increasing the size of the Militia and its role in domestic operations.
- The Militia will be increased to a total part-time strength of 45,000 over ten years. While some new units and locations may be activated most of the increase in personnel will serve in existing units in existing locations. New roles and missions will be assigned.
- The pay of part-time reservists will be treated equally with all other federal government salaries. Part-time pay will no longer be included in operations and maintenance budgets, but will be treated with the same respect as regular force pay.
- Militia recruiting will be based solely on the part-time strength of units. Militia soldiers serving full-time will be counted against regular force establishments and budgets.
- Militia training must reflect the part-time nature of Militia employment. Individual advancement within the Militia must allow for a part-time career without the necessity of individuals training full-time for unrealistic periods and at times not suited to part-time calendars.

